



THE POLITICAL ECONOMIST

NEWSLETTER OF THE SECTION ON POLITICAL ECONOMY, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

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"Worth a Thousand Words" The Impact of Children on the Earnings of Men and Women



Henrik Kleven, Camille Landais, and Jakob Egholt Sogaard are the Fall 2018 winners of "Worth a Thousand Words." The two figures above come from their article "Children and Gender Inequality: Evidence from Denmark," forthcoming in *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*. Figure A shows the evolution of total labor market earnings of men and women over time relative to the year before the birth of their first child, while controlling for the underlying wage growth in the economy and the effect of individuals getting older and more experienced over time. The figure is constructed using population-wide administrative data for Denmark covering all parents who have their first child between 1985 and 2003. For each parent, we follow his or her labor market career over a period from 5 years before the birth of the first child to 10 years after.

In the years leading up to the birth of the first child, men and women follow almost the same trend, but just after the birth of the child they diverge sharply with the earnings of women dropping by around 30 percent. After the initial drop, the earnings of women recover somewhat, but after 10 years the earnings of women are still around 20 percent lower than they would have been with the impact of children. In contrast, the arrival of children has no effect on the earnings of men.

Figure B uses the estimated impact of children in Figure A (allowing for cohort specific impacts) to decompose the total earnings gap into child-related gender inequality and residual inequality. As shown in the figure, the fraction of the total earnings gap caused by children has doubled over time, from about 40 percent in 1980 to around 80 percent in 2013. This dramatic change reflects a combination of two underlying changes: (i) child related gender inequality in earnings has increased from about 18 percent to 20 percent, and (ii) total gender inequality in earnings has fallen from about 46 percent to 24 percent.

Citations

Henrik Kleven, Camille Landais, and Jakob Egholt Sogaard. forthcoming. "Children and Gender Inequality: Evidence from Denmark" *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*

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FROM THE PRESIDENT

I would like to thank the outgoing Section Chair, **Isabela Mares** (Yale University), the outgoing Secretary-Treasurer, **David Primo** (Rochester), the Executive Committee members, **Leonardo Arriola** (Berkeley), **Mark Dincecco** (University of Michigan), **Kellee Tsai** (Johns Hopkins), **Stephanie Rickard** (London School of Economics), **Jonathan Rodden** (Stanford), and **Rachel Wellhausen** (UT Austin), and our 2018 APSA Program Chairs, **Rory Truex** (Princeton) and **Victor Menaldo** (University of Washington).

I would also like to welcome our leadership team for 2018-20. Apart from me, this includes Secretary-Treasurer **George Krause** (University of Georgia), and Executive Committee members **Lisa Blaydes** (Stanford), **Layna Mosley** (UNC at Chapel Hill), **Maggie Penn** (Emory University), **Jan Pierskalla** (Ohio State University), **David Skarbek** (Brown University), and **Hye Young You** (New York University). Our 2019 program chairs are **Scott Abramson** (Rochester) and **Alisha Holland** (Princeton).

Congratulations go to the 2017-18 Political Economy Section Award winners: the **Riker award for the Best Book in Political Economy** went to Mark Dincecco and Massimiliano G. Onorato (IMT Lucca) for *From Warfare to Wealth: The Military Origins of Urban Prosperity in Europe*, *Cambridge University Press*, 2017. The **Mancur Olson Award for the Best Dissertation in Political Economy** completed in 2016-17 went to Pavithra Suryanarayan (Johns Hopkins University) for "Hollowing Out the State: Essays on Status Inequality, Fiscal Capacity, and Right-Wing Voting in India." Junyan Jiang received an honorable mention for his dissertation "Fragmented Unity: Patronage Politics and Authoritarian Resilience in China." The **Fiona McGillivray Award for Best APSA Paper Presented at the Previous Year's APSA** went to Agustina Paglayan (UCSD) for her paper "Civil War, State Consolidation, and the Spread of Mass Education." The **Michael Wallerstein award for the best published article in political economy** to In Song Kim (MIT) for his article "Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization." *American Political Science Review*, Vol 111, No. 1. I am grateful to all those who served on the award committees for their important work.

The Political Economy section has over six hundred members, with roughly a quarter of its membership drawn from students. We decided at the business meeting to waive section dues for students.

The 2019 Annual Meeting of the APSA will be held from August 29-September 1, 2019 in Washington. The Political Economy section welcomes paper and panel proposals that address the annual meeting's theme of "Populism and Privilege" through the lens of political economy, broadly understood. The deadline for proposals is Tuesday, January 15, 2019. We look forward to seeing you there! Thank you for your contributions to the section.

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FROM THE EDITORS

The Fall 2018 issue of *The Political Economist* features *The Political Economy of Gender* as its theme. Scholars have become increasingly interested in studying issues of gender in political economy as events of the last years have put issues of gender front and center. The rise of the #metoo movement and the politicization of the gender gap debate have contributed to policy changes across the West to improve gender equality on a number of dimensions, not least in the work place. We now know that women are more likely to bear the brunt of child-rearing and upbringing, with substantial consequences for their economic status (i.e. their wages) and their participation in political life.

Despite the ubiquitous evidence of this gender gap in economic and political life, many fascinating questions have not been answered yet. Why are women more likely to take on more family work? What factors explain the gender gap in political participation? What is the relative importance of strategic versus psychological factors? What are factors that contribute to a reduction in this gender gap? And are the effects the same for women in different economic environments? Can they translate across polities and countries of different income levels? And what are the economic and political consequences of reducing the gender gap?

To shed more light on some of these questions, we asked three scholars who have provided central contributions to the study of gender and political economy to contribute to this issue. **Frances McCall Rosenbluth** (Yale University), **Soledad Prillaman** (University of Oxford), and **Amanda Clayton** (Vanderbilt University).

The first two essays by Rosenbluth and Prillaman address the causes of the gender gap in greater detail. Both essays argue that psychological and economic factors can explain the gender gap in economic and political participation. Rosenbluth focuses on factors that explain the likely success in economic participation and finds that firms prefer assertive candidates that are available around the clock. Whether these results, especially pertaining to female participation, translate into developing countries is the focus of Prillaman's contribution. Prillaman demonstrates the tremendous heterogeneity in the "political gender gap" around the world. South Asia sticks out for its lower level of female political participation. Explanations borrowed from the experiences in rich democracies only take us so far. Focusing on India, Prillman argues that the breadth and structure of women's social networks can contribute to greater political participation. Clayton's contribution complements these arguments by focusing on the consequences of reducing the gender gap in legislative representation. Increasing the proportion of women in parliament, perhaps using gender quota systems, can significantly shift government priorities, such as spending on health or the military.

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FEATURE ESSAY

The Political Economy of Gender

Frances McCall Rosenbluth (Yale University)

Today's "behavioral revolution" confronts political economy, itself a blend of politics and economics, with the rising importance of the third discipline of psychology. Partly because of academic convenience (people's beliefs are relatively easy to measure experimentally), and partly because of evidence (Tversky and Kahneman and others have shown widespread irrationality), political economy's workhorse assumption of utility maximization has lost its hegemony.

Still, as we observe in the realm of gender, utility maximization remains a good place to start. Employers' calculations of the returns to investment in the human capital of their workers provides a reasonable benchmark—and the best available—for observed patterns of gender equality across countries and across sectors. In countries and in industries in which career interruptions on account of child rearing are costlier to employers on account of long term labor contracts (western Europe, East Asia) and in industries with learning-by-doing and/or long-term client relationships (investment banking and corporate law; weak-party political systems), women earn less and/or are hired or elected less often (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008, 2010).

We also know that, on average, women who earn more income relative to their male partners have more bargaining power in the home as evidenced by spending and leisure patterns (Lundberg and Pollak 1996; Gustafsson 1997; Hutchinson, McGuire, Rosenbluth, and Yamagishi 2018). The policy implications are along the lines of what Virginia Woolf intuited a century ago: A woman needs a room of her own, *and* five hundred pounds. Policies aimed at gender equality are unlikely to work unless they address the issue of women's larger burden of family work and everything that follows from that.

Utility maximization hits a speed bump at that point. Why do women the world-over undertake more family work? Do women and men gain different degrees of emotional satisfaction from investing in children for evolutionary reasons? Can the efficiency gains of a gendered division of labor possibly be so irresistible? Or are social norms so entrenched that the unfair economic advantages of the unencumbered are invisible and therefore not questioned? (See, for example, Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2013; Lowes, Nunn, Robinson, and Weigel, 2017).

Sorting out these questions is one of the research frontiers in the political economy of gender. Within the home, Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015) found a curious discontinuity in earnings and bargaining power: although, on average, greater earnings translate into leverage over family decisions, women do *more* family work, possibly in psychic payment to humiliated husbands, when they earn more than their husbands. (For a similar finding, see also Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre, and Matheson, 2003.) Judging from successful female politicians in Sweden, women who are "too ambitious" are more likely to get divorced (Folke and Rickne 2016).

It seems that women invite social opprobrium for being "too ambitious" whereas men do so for being not ambitious enough. This tendency may be especially pronounced in politics where voters may attempt to solve agency problems by choosing representatives who are like themselves (Besley and Coate 1997). Voters in the U.S. appear to prefer representatives who are "married with kids," which means that women who run for office carry one of two burdens: an extra work load, or having to prove likeability despite not being a favored "type" (Teele, Kalla, and Rosenbluth 2018).

In the business world, on the other hand, being "married with kids" should be a negative signal for females but not for males in a world in which women carry a larger family burden. In fact, that appears to be the case. Raw salary averages (which includes self-selection out of highly paid, time-inflexible jobs) show a "mommy penalty" in every rich democracy in the world¹. The biggest penalties are in Japan and South Korea where women are expected to quit their jobs upon child bearing, but the penalties are not small even in Scandinavian countries with gender-equalizing policies of various kinds, presumably because firms avoid hiring and promoting women who come with the unfunded mandate to cover the costs of career interruption.

If business employers penalize mothers for utility-maximizing reasons, what about the converse? There is no *economic* reason to penalize women who can commit to long hours on the job, and some evidence suggests that openly lesbian women earn more than their straight counterparts (Klawitter 2014). Nevertheless, Bursztyn, Fujiwara, and Pallais (2017) find that women who are capable and ambitious enough to get into Harvard Business School apparently pull their punches when they want to show they are good marriage material. Only the women who were already married were willing to show drive. Given that "mating and dating" (Wilcox, Brewer, Shames, and Lake 2007) occurs during key years of educational and career investment, this kind of self-handicapping could be a serious problem for female equality and deserves further study.

In a conjoint survey experiment involving over 5,000 business students and alumni from around the world, Nellis, Rosenbluth, and Weaver (2017) found no bias against hypothetical female candidates for career promotion, controlling for productivity. An assertive personality gave hypothetical candidates a sixteen percent boost over unassertive ones irrespective of gender (when

1 <https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/the-mommy-penalty-around-the-world/>

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respondents were given no information about the candidate's productivity on the job). Our study did not ask about likability, however, and it is possible that assertive females manage to be successful without being particularly well liked while assertive males are both successful and well liked. As with the leaky pipeline for women in politics, gendered cultural norms about likable personalities may discourage women who otherwise would strive for business leadership.

To return to the question with which we began of utility maximization versus beliefs and prejudices, psychology is part of the story but not all of it. In our conjoint experiment asking about candidates for promotion, the 16% boost for assertiveness was dwarfed by the 36% premium on availability around the clock when respondents were given no information about individual productivity. Firms, of course, have an incentive to garner information about the productivity of each worker; but in group production settings individual contribution can be hard to identify, and firms may fall back on cheap proxies for productivity such as "billable hours" and around the clock availability. In 2018, when women still bear disproportionate burden for family work, more men than women have those kazoos blowing "noisy signals" of productivity. Gender equality is still a long way off, and awaits the equalization of cultural norms about who takes care of the kids before psychology should get any more blame.

A fruitful area for future exploration, then, is to understand how social norms favoring gendered family roles impede the demand for female labor (including in politics) on the one hand; and on the other how particular labor markets (with high or low returns to uninterrupted human capital) can reinforce or undermine those norms. The fact that Scandinavian countries have near gender parity in politics while relatively few women make it to managerial positions in the private sector suggests that cultural change by itself is not enough. It is important to grasp the incentives of employers (including voters!) and of the women who decide whether or not to put up the struggle against bad odds. The odds may one day equalize if men and women take equal amounts of time out for family work (or if it becomes equally likely that men and women take time off, in the event of some continued specialization); but plenty of markets still create incentives that reinforce stereotypical gender norms, putting off that day. In the meantime, we all watch with interest as Scandinavian women attempt to use politics to change markets. Take-it-or-leave-it paternity leave is great, but three in four Swedish men, for example, leave the benefit on the table for fear of losing advantage at work. Scandinavian childcare provisions are also impressive, but they do not solve the problem of jobs that require around-the-clock availability. We await, perhaps, that world envisioned by Keynes in 1930² in which human-displacing machines can be made into a blessing instead of a curse, and in which "family-work balance" stands for attainment rather than a euphemism for underachieving females.

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² Keynes first presented these ideas in 1928 in a talk to the Political Economy Club at Cambridge. In October 1930 he published the paper in two installments in the *Nation* and *Athenaeum*.

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FEATURE ESSAY

Unraveling the Persistent Political Gender Gap in Developing Countries


Soledad Artiz Prillaman (Harvard University)

Women around the globe, but particularly in many developing contexts, remain absent and invisible in political institutions and dialogue. This may seem surprising with the rise of the #metoo movement across the West and the groundbreaking number of women running for office in the United States in 2018, it is easy to imagine similar gains to women’s representation around the globe. Even more, as of 2015, women’s suffrage in democracies is nearly universal and more than 130 countries have gone so far as to implement political quotas for women (Hughes et al 2019). Gender quotas, for example, have been shown to increase women’s representation, shift policy towards women’s interests, and improve gender equality along other dimensions (Lott and Kenny 1999; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Miller 2008; Beaman et al. 2009; Catalano 2009; Ford and Pande 2011, Clayton and Zetterberg 2018).

Yet women as citizens show up and speak up less in political spaces than men across much of the globe and particularly in lower and middle-income countries. Figure 1 depicts this gender gap in political participation based on data from the World Values Survey Waves 1-6.¹ A positive gender gap indicates that, on average, men participate more than women. In most regions, the only measure on which women show up as much as men is the rate they turn out to vote. The exception is the Middle East and North Africa where on average, 20 percentage points fewer women report voting than men. Looking at non-voting political participation tells a different story. In low and middle-income regions, far fewer women participate in politics on non-election days than men. In fact, women in South Asia participate in politics on average 20 percentage points less than men. This large gender gap is supported by data from an original survey in India, which demonstrates that women participate in local politics at one third the rate of men, far eclipsing the caste gap in political participation (Artiz Prillaman 2017).

¹ Figure 1 plots the gender gap in reported voting in the most recent national election across seven global regions and the gender gap in non-voting political participation, specifically via protesting, petitioning, striking, or political occupation.

Figure 1: The Gender Gap in Political Participation Across the Globe



Source: Artiz Prillaman 2017

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Our understanding of gendered inequalities in political participation derives in large part from research on high-income democracies (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Inglehart and Norris 2000; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010; Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014). Seminal theories focused on explaining individual-level political behavior begin from the premise that access to resources – money, education, and time – conditions the costs of political engagement. The gender gap in political participation therefore is argued to be the result of a gender gap in resources (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). Women, to a greater degree than men, have not accumulated the political and non-political resources necessary to reduce the costs to political participation. The implication is that, as resources equalize, so does political participation.

Alternative traditional political economy models, as argued principally by Becker (1981), have focused on the household instead of the individual and explain women's lack of participation as the efficient outcome of the household division of labor. In this model, women bear the responsibility for the household because of a marginal advantage in childcare and corresponding socialization patterns. Households' interests are therefore perfectly aligned and households behave as unitary actors. One implication of this model is that this economic division of labor could also generate a political division of labor with men representing the household's interests in political spaces because of greater access to relevant resources and subsequent lower costs of participation.

Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006) argue that to explain cross-national variation in female labor force participation and women's political preferences, models of household behavior must account for incomplete marriage contracting and the risk of divorce. They suggest that the risk of divorce generates incentives for both women and men to invest in outside options as insurance. In this model, women are likely to have different political preferences than men over policies that would reduce the costs to non-household labor and allow them to invest more in these outside options. Their model thus no longer assumes the household will behave as a unitary actor. Following the logic of Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001), women's increased economic engagement under threat of divorce is likely to help to equalize the gender gap in resources and yield greater political participation by women.

The present experiences of women in low and middle-income democracies pose a challenge to these models of political behavior: while women's political participation remains below that of men, it varies importantly within and across countries even when risk of divorce is held constant. For example, in the specific case of India, where my work has been focused, women's political participation remains low on average but grassroots women's movements have emerged and effectuated important political change. A notable example is the Gulabi Gang in India, an informal group of women in North India known for their pink Saris that have fought to reduce domestic violence and have become a political force to be reckoned with. How can we explain the persistently low participation of women in politics across many developing countries while also building models that account for the growing number of contradictory cases?

To begin with, several relevant facts must be incorporated into models of gendered behavior in developing countries. First, even in regions where divorce is rare and a strong economic division of labor persists, intrahousehold preferences often diverge (Gottlieb et al 2016). In recent work, I have argued and demonstrated how gendered preference differences can emerge from the economic division of labor itself. Take, for example, the public provision of water. While the entire household benefits from the provision of water, women, in their role as household caretaker, bear the responsibility for the collection of water. They therefore have a greater stake in the quality and location of water provision than their husbands and are more likely to prioritize the provision of water in their political demands. Intrahousehold preference differences can also derive from gender-specific experiences (for example, violence against women) or simply because women have a desire to increase gender equality.

Second, gender gaps in political preferences often go hand in hand with gender gaps in political participation. Women may remain absent from political spaces even if their preferences are underrepresented in those spaces. Recent work by Sarah Khan (2017) shows that women are more likely to prioritize their husband's preferences, especially when the intrahousehold preference differential is large. These first two conclusions suggest the need for a model that can explain household coordination but allow for intrahousehold variation in preferences.

Third, while resource stocks may correlate with political participation and may even be a necessary condition for political participation, removing the gap in resources alone is unlikely to induce women's political participation (Desposato and Norrander 2009; Gottlieb 2016). For example, using original survey data from rural India, I find 86% of the gender gap in political participation is left unexplained by differences in resources (education, labor market participation, free time, voluntary activity, and civic skills) from a Blinder Oaxaca decomposition.

Motivated by these facts and the variation in women's political participation in India, in my book project I study the case of rural India to ask why most women remain absent from political spaces, when and why women mobilize, and when gender becomes a unifying and politically salient identity. My theoretical model centers on the household and the nature of political coordination in patrilocal, non-nuclear families, arguing that most households will coordinate their political behavior and behave as a unitary actor. This creates a household political division of labor, where men act as the political agent of the household and vocalized household preferences skew in favor of men's interests.

Why would women coordinate their political behavior with the household? I argue that the degree of women's social isolation/social connectedness shapes their capacity to coordinate their political behavior *outside* the household. Gender-biased social norms

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limit women's role outside of the household (Chhibber 2002). Often the woman's space is seen as the house whereas men have the freedom to engage in community institutions and politics in particular is seen as a man's space. This division is enforced with substantial mobility constraints: 72% of women in a representative survey from India reported having to ask permission to visit a friend or family member in their village and 23% said that even if granted permission they would not be allowed to go alone. All of which is enforced through a fear of backlash, often through social sanctions and even violence.

Broader political systems also differ markedly in low and middle-income contexts. Faced with clientelistic linkages between the political elite and citizens, the costs and benefits to participation change (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2009). Many of the constraints imposed on women's mobility and connectedness inhibit them from access to clientelistic networks. Strategic politicians observe this household coordination and minimize their mobilization costs by efficiently targeting critical nodes within their networks. Women's social isolation therefore further restricts their political participation by limiting their access to prevailing political networks.

This political division of labor therefore underrepresents women's interests and suppresses women's voice as a result of disparities in economic bargaining power, intra-household resources inequalities, and gender-biased social norms, creating a system of gender-based insiders and outsiders. Despite the infrequency of divorce, this coordination is inefficient due to intrahousehold preference differences.

When women's social networks, however, shift in such a way as to include more women, women's political participation is likely to increase. To test this relationship, research I conducted in Madhya Pradesh, India, leveraged a natural experiment that created as-if random variation in exposure to an NGO program aimed at mobilizing women into small credit collectives. Participation in these women's credit groups yielded substantial increases in women's non-voting, local political participation through three key mechanisms: political coordination within the women's group as opposed to the household, information dissemination, and the development of civic skills.

Women's representation as citizens in political spaces is important on normative grounds of political inclusion and on political economy grounds because it is likely to cause policy change. We know that when women enter politics, policy changes. In India, women's representation in local elected offices increased the provision of certain public goods (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). In Latin America, women's political movements have yielded the greatest impacts on policies aimed at combating violence against women (Htun and Weldon 2012). And in Sub-Saharan Africa women's representation in national office is associated with greater political engagement by women (Barnes and Burchard 2013). Yet, our understanding of women's decisions to participate in politics has for a long time failed to recognize that the constraint to doing so is not simply lack of resources, a household division of labor or the rules of divorce, but the combination of all of these with social norms that preclude extra-household political networks. Once we recognize this, it becomes possible to explain and respond to the persistent gender gap in political participation across developing democracies.

The study of the political economy of gender in developing countries remains an exciting and open landscape. As low and middle-income countries democratize, industrialize, deindustrialize, urbanize, and diversify, the opportunity to understand the micro-foundations and macro-consequences of women's political behavior will continue to grow. There remains an open research agenda to tie together the importance of social coordination for individual and collective political participation, thinking carefully about the intersectionality of identities, to create an integrated explanation of the gender gap in political participation that accounts for the nuanced experiences of women in low and middle income contexts. In doing so, it has the potential to shed light on how systems of behavior fit into a broader understanding of governance and pathways to political and economic development and highlight the particular role of women's inclusion.

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
FEATURE ESSAY

Changing Priorities? The Distributional Consequences of Women's Increased Political Representation

Amanda Clayton (Vanderbilt University)

Women are entering politics at an unprecedented pace. In 1998, women held just 11.8 percent of legislative seats in single or lower parliamentary houses worldwide. In the last twenty years that number has more than doubled and women now hold 23.8 percent of these seats. Three countries, Rwanda, Bolivia, and Cuba, now have majority-female parliaments and in ten additional countries, women occupy more than 40 percent of national legislative seats. Figure 1 shows the distribution of women's parliamentary representation worldwide in 1998 and 2008. These distributions reveal that not only has women's representation increased dramatically in the last twenty years, but there is also significantly more variation across countries today. In 1998, only 19 countries had legislatures with over 20 percent women, while today 99 countries meet this threshold.

Figure 1: Global Distribution of Women's Numeric Representation in Single or Lower Parliamentary Houses



This rapid, but uneven, increase in women's presence in political decision-making has sparked both public and scholarly interest in the possible policy-related consequences of this phenomenon. Here, I briefly address three questions that have become central to my research and part of the growing body of work examining how women's increased presence in political decision-making affects representative outcomes: Do more gender-diverse legislatures make different decisions about how government resources are allocated? If so, in what policy areas do we observe these differences? And why do we observe the distributional patterns that we do?

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Does increasing women's representation affect government spending priorities? If so, in what areas?

To investigate these questions, in research with Pär Zetterberg, I take advantage of an increasingly popular policy tool used to address women's underrepresentation: the adoption and implementation of electoral gender quotas (see Clayton and Zetterberg 2018). To date, over eighty countries have reformed their constitutions or created new electoral laws, which require quotas for the number of women candidates on party lists or legislative seats in national parliaments and nearly seventy countries have adopted these measures at the subnational level. In addition, over 130 political parties have voluntarily adopted internal mandates requiring women to comprise a certain number of slots on party lists, often with placement mandates and sanctions for non-compliance (see Hughes, et al. Forthcoming). On average, quotas are effective, increasing women's representation from about ten percent of national legislative seats to twenty percent in one electoral cycle. Using time-series cross-sectional data from 138 states during the peak period of quota implementation (1995 – 2012), Pär and I find that quota adoption is followed by significant increases in government spending on public health. Further, we find that health spending increases with the percentage of women who enter office through quotas.

Our findings comport with case-based research that suggests that women legislators prioritize health spending. For instance, Michelle Swers (2002, 2013) shows that women in the U.S. Congress are more likely than men to advocate for issues that affect women's rights and welfare in legislative speeches, including issues related to women's health care. Indeed, health policy is an area where we see one of the biggest gender differences in the amount of legislative speech devoted to a particular issue with congresswomen devoting about twice the amount of time speaking on the subject as congressmen.¹

Turning back to the impact of gender quotas on health spending globally, when examining where the reprioritization health spending comes from, Pär and I find that large increases in women's numeric representation are associated both with increases in total health spending and in total government spending. This supports research from advanced industrialized countries, which suggests that women favor larger public service sectors and more redistributive spending than men in general and thus presumably tolerate greater levels of government spending (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010).

In sum, the cross-national data seem to suggest that women's entrance into politics is associated with increased spending on public health, which may come in part from increased overall spending. Using compositional models, we also find that the increases in health spending are offset by relative decreases in military spending, but no changes in education spending. Yet, these data come from annual budget expenditures collected by the World Bank and thus are not particularly fine-grained. What about more specific policy areas?

To address this question, in a recent article I co-authored with Cecilia Josefsson, Robert Mattes, and Shaheen Mozaffar, we use original survey data from more than 800 elected members of parliament (MPs) in 17 sub-Saharan African countries to assess whether there are gender differences in self-declared preferences for the top issue areas that government should address (see Clayton, et al. 2018). We find that women MPs give higher prioritization than their male colleagues to issues related to poverty alleviation, health care, and women's rights, whereas men MPs prioritize infrastructure projects to a greater degree than women MPs. Relying on survey data from more than 19,000 citizens from the same 17-country sample, we find the gender differences we observe among MPs correspond closely in size and substance with gender differences among citizens. While this research only looks at MP self-expressed priorities rather than whether or how these priorities are enacted, our findings support the growing body of research suggesting that increasing women's representation shifts the collective preferences of legislative bodies.

It appears then that men are representing men and women are representing women. But why is this the case? Why does legislator gender matter at all if representatives typically need to appeal to both men and women constituents? Many important political theorists have tackled these questions (notably Phillips 1995, Mansbridge 1999, Young 2000), and have generated a series of potential explanations. For instance, women and men legislators may share similar priorities as their co-gender constituents because of similar internally held beliefs based on shared gendered life experiences (Mansbridge 1999). Or it could be that women representatives in particular feel a mandate to represent the interests and priorities of women citizens because their group has been historically excluded from positions of power (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). Finally, if citizens are more likely to engage with co-gender representatives (Barnes and Burchard 2012), MPs may be more aware of the priorities of citizens who share their gender.

Thus, to return to the two questions posed above: Yes, when women enter into national political decision-making bodies, government's legislative and spending priorities seem to change. Women representatives appear to give greater prioritization to issues related to public health, poverty alleviation, and women's rights and relatively less prioritization to issues related to infrastructure and defense as compared to their male colleagues. It also appears that these differences in priorities are manifested in how governments choose to allocate state resources. As women enter politics, spending patterns shift to reflect their priorities.

Why do men and women hold different priorities?

Some of the issue areas above map in predictable ways onto the divergent social and economic experiences of men and women. For

¹ For a great visualization of this, see: <https://pudding.cool/2018/07/women-in-congress/>

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instance, men likely prioritize infrastructure projects, most notably roads, because they travel more frequently and further from the home than women and thus may benefit more than women from investments in this area. Additionally, work on infrastructure projects is typically completed by male laborers, who benefit from increased jobs in this sector (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Olken 2010).

Yet other policy areas are somewhat less intuitive. Evidence of women's greater prioritization of poverty alleviation and health care has shown up consistently across Latin American, African, South Asian, and Western cases (Tremblay 1998, Wängnerud 2000, Schwindt-Bayer 2006, Miller 2008, Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras 2014, Gottlieb, et al. 2016) That this finding is so consistent across incredibly diverse cases points to an unanswered question in the gender and politics literature: Why are poverty and health women's issues?

Previous work on this subject has largely attributed women citizens' prioritization of health care and poverty alleviation to their disproportionate role worldwide as caretakers, both within their households and larger communities (e.g. Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras 2014, Gottlieb, et al. 2016). Yet, this finding also emerges among politically elite women who themselves are less exposed to personal poverty and presumably have good access to health care, suggesting gendered personal experiences may not be the whole story. A more political answer is also possible: Because health care is a feminized policy area, one that comports with gender norms around women's roles as caregivers, women representatives may be able to claim this domain when traditionally masculine policy domains (e.g., defense, finance) are already claimed by men (see Schwindt-Bayer 2006, Barnes and O'Brien 2018).

While it appears that women's increased presence in political decision-making affects how legislatures allocate government resources, new findings are continually adding nuance to these general models. For instance, some of the most interesting political economy work on this front examines how and why men and women form divergent political preferences in the first place. Building on Gary Becker's foundational model of household decision-making, Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006, 2010) reinvigorated this research area. Their work examined the gender gap in redistributive preferences using temporal and cross-national variation across industrialized democracies, and scholars are now asking whether and how these theories travel across a wide variety of settings. Sarah Khan (2018), for instance, uses a related model to understand the circumstances in which women in rural Pakistan form and express political preferences that are distinct from those held by their husbands. As she details in her contribution here, Soledad Prillaman is doing excellent research to better understand when women will participate in politics, an important precondition if political leaders are going to fully consider women's distinct interests, preferences, and priorities in decision-making.

Both of these young scholars are not only investigating important substantive questions on the political economy of gender, but they are also applying cutting-edge methodological techniques to do so. Prillaman, for instance, uses the intersection of a natural experiment and a field experiment to understand how the combination of both interventions affect women's political participation. Khan also uses a combination of field and survey experimental techniques to understand how gendered preferences emerge within the household. I am encouraged by this type of scholarship that moves away from the "add women and stir" model of short-term interventions that require women to fill temporary leadership posts, but rather uses experimental techniques to understand the origins and malleability of gendered dynamics that are deeply socially engrained. Indeed, this is where I see the field heading: the use of causal-inference-based methods to test and expand on decades of existing political, economic, sociological theories of gender. To this end, along with Tiffany Barnes and Dawn Teele, I have formed the Empirical Study of Gender (EGEN) Working Group, and we have begun hosting workshops for junior scholars to receive constructive and thorough feedback on their early-stage work. The proliferation of these sorts of research networks and the important work that is coming out of them are particularly timely as women continue to enter politics at an unprecedented pace, transforming the composition of representative institutions worldwide.

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